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ABSTRACT: The EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed provides information on sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) notifications. With a set of data from the 1998-2013 period, we test the hypothesis 
that past notifications can determine current notifications. This is the “reputation effect”, meaning that 
inspectors may tend to target products or countries with previous SPS problems. We analyze the scope of 
the reputation effect over time. We used two count data models to estimate the distribution of current no-
tifications. In line with previous literature, our findings indicate that reputation does affect current EU no-
tifications. Furthermore, we identify some relevant exporter countries for which reputation is long-lasting.
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Medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias en las importaciones agroalimentarias 
de la Unión Europea: los efectos reputación a lo largo del tiempo
RESUMEN: El sistema de alerta rápida para alimentos de la UE informa sobre notificaciones sanitarias 
y fitosanitarias. Con datos del periodo 1998-2013, se comprueba la hipótesis de si notificaciones pasadas 
afectan a las notificaciones presentes. Se trata del efecto reputación, que implica que los inspectores pue-
den dirigir sus inspecciones a productos o países que hayan tenido previamente problemas sanitarios y fi-
tosanitarios; también se analiza el alcance temporal de la reputación. Se utilizan dos modelos de recuento 
para estimar la distribución de las notificaciones actuales. Los resultados muestran que la reputación in-
fluye en las notificaciones actuales de la UE. Además, se identifican varios exportadores relevantes para 
los que la reputación tiene un efecto duradero.
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1. Introduction
Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) are practices that alter the conditions of interna-
tional trade, including those measures that restrict it as well others that incentivize it. 
Prices as well as traded quantities are altered as a result of those practices. Economic 
literature has treated extensively NTMs in recent decades. One line of discussion re-
fers to the political economy behind the implementation of NTMs in different coun-
tries. Some analysts argue that NTMs are implemented to guarantee high quality and 
compliance with technical standards (Mahé, 1997; Disdier et al., 2015); in this vein, 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) employed the expression “standards as catalysts”, stating 
that the standards help to correct market failures, while others point to protectionist 
reasons. For instance, one classical hypothesis is the existence of “policy substitu-
tion” (Copeland, 1990; Ederington, 2001; Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). Its proponents 
argue that, together with multilateral tariff cuts, countries may implement NTMs to 
secure a certain level of protection for domestic production.
Therefore, to ascertain the trade-enhancing or trade-deterrent role of NTMs, some 
recent researches have investigated how NTMs affect the agri-food trade (Cadot et 
al., 2012; Yue and Beghin, 2009). A point to stress is that limited access to consistent 
and updated information and various methodology limitations make the estimation of 
the NTM impacts on the agri-food trade a hard task. Another point to stress, based 
on literature findings, is that the trade-enhancing and trade-deterrent effects found 
empirically are very often country- and sector-specific (Dal Bianco et al., 2015). For 
instance, fresh and processed food are not significantly affected by these measures 
(Fontagné et al., 2005).
A specific category of NTMs includes border measures “…such as restriction 
for substances and ensuring food safety, and those for preventing dissemination of 
disease or pests as well as all conformity-assessment measures related to food safety, 
such as certification, testing and inspection, and quarantine” (UNCTAD, 2015; p. 
4). These kinds of NTMs which are termed are the so-called Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary (or SPS) Measures. Many actors are involved in the definition of specific SPS 
measures (policymakers, producers’ and consumers’ organizations, environmental 
associations, etc.) which is why these measures tend to be very diverse across coun-
tries and their application is usually a very dynamic and complex process. Conse-
quently, complying with SPS rules can be a challenge for trading partners. 
Over the past few decades, food scares have become a recurring theme in the 
European Union (EU). Food safety standards in the EU are therefore becoming more 
stringent in order to limit the risks associated with contaminated food products. Sani-
tary concerns are more relevant for products like fruits and vegetables or fisheries 
products (Jaud et al., 2013). Indeed, consumer health has become a key concern in 
EU public health policies, a fact which in turn could influence the EU’s preferences 
in supplier selection (Taghouti et al., 2015). Such concerns have the potential to in-
fluence the evolution of EU agri-food imports, and therefore limit market access for 
suppliers who have difficulties in complying with EU sanitary standards.
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In the EU, SPS border measures are defined at the EU level, so that common 
sanitary and safety standards for food products are set for the EU as a whole, while 
national border authorities have the responsibility to control whether or not imports 
meet the established standards. There are some issues related to these controls that 
deserve special attention. In fact, limited resources to inspect all imported agri-food 
products can lead to under-inspection as well as over-inspection. The past can de-
termine which products are controlled, as inspectors might primarily target products 
that have had problems in the past or countries with a high probability of having 
problems to export certain products identified as sensitive in previous inspections. As 
discussed in the next section, a considerable amount of literature has focused on this 
“reputation effect”.
As a tool to raise awareness across Member States about compliance with SPS 
rules by food imports, the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) 
provides information in the form of notifications that indicate when, where and why 
there are food alerts or border rejections of a specific consignment. In this paper, we 
use this database to analyze the EU’s behaviour in the implementation of food safety 
standards at its borders.
Against this background, the main objective of our paper is to explore the repu-
tation effect in the case of European agri-food imports by testing whether past no-
tifications somehow influence current notifications. More specifically, we want to 
ascertain, in the first place, whether this reputation exists or not and, if so, we aim to 
identify and address other questions that can help us gain an insight into the topic: 
Are there differences in the “trade effect” of reputation across countries? What are 
the influencing factors that determine the reputation of a given product or country in 
agri-food trade? Does reputation evolve over time for a given country? 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the no-
tion of reputation at product, sector and country level, departing from a discussion 
of existing literature in this respect. We then explain and discuss the methodology 
chosen for the analysis. The results section shows the relevance of reputation on SPS 
control at the EU borders according to the empirical findings and, after that, we set 
out the main conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis.
2. The notion of reputation
The term “reputation” has been recently employed in literature regarding the 
implementation of SPS measures. This section reviews the emerging literature in 
this area. First, we explore and define the notion of reputation when analysing trade 
in agri-food products. Then we extend the discussion by highlighting the importance 
of considering the effect of reputation over time, which involves differentiating and 
comparing its effects in the short and the long run. 
The notion of reputation was first introduced by Jouanjean et al. (2012; 2015) by 
examining the behaviour of the United States (US) in rejecting agri-food products 
at its frontiers. The above-mentioned authors tested the hypothesis that the border 
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rejections for a product coming from a certain exporter in a given year could raise the 
probability of future rejections for the same product and origin, and they called this 
effect “reputation”. Their results confirmed the hypothesis, i.e. previous-year notifi-
cations increase the probability of notifications in the current year. Hence, Jouanjean 
et al. (2015) suggested that NTMs are not only implemented on the basis of current 
risk, but are also influenced by past risks.
Jouanjean et al.’s methodology involved codifying the US refusals with an ag-
gregation by country of origin and product (classified with 4-digit HS code1) over 
the period 1998-2008. Additionally to this “product-country” reputation, their paper 
distinguishes a “region” and a “sector” reputation effect. For the “region” reputa-
tion, they tested the hypothesis that if a product from a neighbouring country –i.e. 
belonging to the same “region” – was refused in the previous year, then the number 
of refusals for the exporting country in the current year could be expected to increase 
for the same product. As for the “sector” reputation, the same holds true when con-
sidering the aggregation of products at the two-digit level (HS2): the odds of a refusal 
increase if a product from the same sector–i.e. belonging to the same HS2 chapter – 
was notified in the previous year. 
Taghouti et al. (2015) explored EU food safety notifications on agri-food imports, 
giving special attention to Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). Four types of 
reputation were considered, namely product, sector, country and region reputations. 
The results showed that EU notifications are affected mainly by a product’s own 
reputation as well as by the country’s reputation. Besides, the study showed no sign 
of protectionist behaviour by the EU against MPCs, even taking into account prod-
ucts that compete with domestic production.
The results from Tudela-Marco et al. (2016) highlight the fact that EU Member 
states have no common behaviour in implementing border controls for fruits and 
vegetables. Tudela-Marco et al.’s study supports the evidence found by Jouanjean 
et al. (2015) and Taghouti et al. (2015) with regard to reputation. Product reputation 
appears to be more significant in comparison to sector and country reputation. Further-
more, the results of the above-mentioned study showed a strong correlation between 
the degree of development of exporting countries and the number of notifications.
The main conceptual contribution of the present paper is to extend the concept 
of reputation to cover a longer time span. In existing literature, product reputation 
appears to be the most influential. However, to date, the impact of reputation has 
been checked only over a one-year period, and our starting hypothesis is that this 
effect might be longer-lasting. So we will check not only whether notifications in a 
given year affect notifications the following year, but we will also examine whether 
product reputation extends backwards in time up to the third preceding year. A 
further contribution is that we consider fixed country effects in order to examine 
whether SPS border treatment differs for different exporters. 
1 HS refers to the Harmonized System, a standard international system for classifying goods in international 
trade, adopted in the late 1980s.
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3. Data and descriptive analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, RASFF is a system of notification and informa-
tion exchange on emergency sanitary measures at the border of EU Member States. 
It provides information on food notifications at the EU’s borders, specifying which 
shipments of specific products from exporting countries do not comply with food 
safety requirements.2
This data source has been used previously in order to analyze the impact of SPS 
measures on the agri-food trade. In particular, Kleter et al. (2009) explored the use-
fulness of RASFF notifications to identify emerging trends in recent food safety 
issues, based on EU reports. For their part, Jaud et al. (2013) examined the RASFF 
notifications of 146 exporters to the EU in order to determine the geographical con-
centration of EU agri-food imports; and Kallummal et al. (2013) used the RASFF 
database to analyze the impact of EU food safety measures on trade flows between 
South Asian countries and the EU as a whole. 
In our case, in order to analyze the effect of reputation on EU food import no-
tifications, we used an original database of 39 countries3 selected on the grounds 
that they are the most notified partners by the EU in the period under consideration. 
Overall, these countries’ exports received 15,098 notifications, which account for 34 
% of total notifications in the period 1998 to 20134 and which we took as the starting 
point for our research: It should be noted that the RASFF portal provides a complete 
database with product information in verbal form, but notifications are not classified 
under the Harmonized System. Our study includes imports from EU Member States5, 
and all the notifications found belonging to the selected countries were painstakingly 
classified with 4-digit HS codes. The biggest challenge we faced when building this 
database was converting all the recorded product notifications from verbal form to 
HS code. To do so, we designed a word-recognition algorithm complemented by user 
assessment for ambiguous verbal forms. 
Each notification was coded specifying all of the following parameters: the 
identity of the exporting country, the notified product, the sector, and the date of 
notification. The unit of observation is defined as “product (HS4), exporter country, 
year of the notification”. For further analysis, notifications are summed over notified 
products of the same sector (HS2) and over notified products of each country to take 
into account the notifications per sector and per country in each year of the sample. 
2 In addition to the EU, the four European Free Trade Association countries are also RASFF members.
3 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, 
Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United States and Vietnam.
4 We chose a 15-year period, considering that the last data available were from 2013 when the codification was 
made. Overall, there were 44,502 notifications.
5 We took into account the imports of the former EU-15 Member States to ensure consistency and coherence 
over a long period.
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It is important to make two remarks: First, products enter the database only if they 
are exported to the EU15. This has implications for the type of zeroes found in the 
database (see below). Secondly, we included all the notifications for agri-food pro-
ducts except those of the first HS chapter (HS01: Live animals) and HS24 (Tobacco 
and manufactured tobacco substitutes).
Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of the number of notifications. The total 
number of notifications shows a sharply rising trend starting in 1998, with the curve 
levelling off after 2007. Indeed, in the first period (before 2007) the total number of 
notifications rose yearly by 26.27 % while after 2007 this figure dropped to 9 %. The 
average number of notifications in the current year (t) is 944, in one lagged year 868, 
two lagged years 783, and three lagged years 695. 
While we do not specifically analyze this aspect in our paper, some explanation 
on the type of notifications issued may be appropriate. There are different types of 
notifications, depending on the action taken: alert notifications, information and 
news notifications, and border rejections. They are indicators about which export-
ing countries and products fulfill the food safety and quality standards required by 
EU (RASFF, 2013). In accordance with the Regulation (EC) No 16/2011, an alert 
notification is defined as an information sent when a food or feed presenting a seri-
ous health risk on the market has to be treated with priority. Information notifications 
are used when a risk has been detected about food or feed placed on the market, but 
the other members do not have to handle it quickly. Besides, any information related 
to the safety of food and feed products which has not been transmitted as an alert or 
an information notification, but which is considered interesting for the control au-
thorities, is sent to the members under the heading ‘News’6. Finally, border rejections 
mean a notification of a rejection in respect with food and feed consignments that 
have been tested and rejected at the external borders of the EU when a health risk has 
been identified.
Over 36 % of notified products were rejected at the borders of the EU in the pe-
riod 1998-2013. 51.5 % of total notifications were information notifications. Figure 1 
illustrates the changes for different types of notifications: in addition to the increase 
in the total number of notifications since the early 2000s, a change took place from 
2007 onwards, i.e. a shift from information to the more restrictive category –rejec-
tions– is apparent. While this is probably linked to the above-mentioned greater con-
cern for food safety, it clearly also points to a more restrictive implementation of SPS 
measures at the EU borders.
Figure 2 shows a significant level of heterogeneity among notifying EU Member 
States in terms of their respective share of the total number of notifications, based on 
averages over the period 1998-2013. Italy (16.4 %), United Kingdom (16.4 %) and 
Germany (16.3 %) are the top notifying countries. This fact might reflect the differ-
ent agri-food imports structure and volumes among EU Member States. It could also 
indicate inspections are not operated uniformly across the EU, as the findings from 
Tudela-Marco et al. (2016) suggest.
6 For this reason, we plot News and Information together.
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FIGURE 1
Evolution in the number of notifications and breakdown by type. 1998-2013
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FIGURE 2
Percent of total notifications by Member State (1998-2013). In percentage
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Figure 3 depicts the heterogeneity among countries that receive notifications. 
Apart from Turkey, the countries most affected by notifications are the two largest 
Asian countries, followed by the United States. Turkey accounts for 16.1 % of obser-
vations, followed by China (15.8 %), India (11.1 %) and the US (7.9 %). 
FIGURE 3
Percent of total notifications by country (Top 10 notified countries), average 
1998-2013
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on RASFF data.
Figure 4 shows the frequency of notifications for each agri-food sector. The most 
notified sectors are “Fish and crustaceans” (HS03) and “Fresh fruits” (HS08), each 
accounting for more than one fifth of total notifications in our database. These sectors 
are followed by HS chapters 12 (Oil seeds and oleaginous), HS 09 (Coffee, tea and 
spices) and 07 (Vegetables).
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FIGURE 4
Percent of total notifications by HS2 chapter, average 1998-2013
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,3
0,4
0,8
0,8
1,1
1,5
1,5
2,0
2,6
2,9
3,1
4,3
5,7
7,0
8,1
16,3
20,3
20,7
0 5 10 15 20 25
23
06
13
05
14
18
22
11
15
17
04
10
19
16
20
21
02
07
09
12
08
03
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RASFF data.
4. Methodology and model specification 
Given the definition of all notifications types (see the previous section), it is im-
portant to stress that we assume that the reputation of a product or an exporting coun-
try can be affected by any type of information transmitted by the RASFF network. 
Therefore, in the present study the number of notifications includes all types of no-
tifications. This choice also relies on previous studies carried out by several authors 
(Kleter et al., 2009; Jaud et al., 2013; Kallummal et al., 2013; Jouanjean et al., 2012, 
2015). These authors use notifications as dependent variable to determine the impact 
of SPS measures on agro-food trade. Also, the number of notifications is widely used 
as a measure to analyze the behavior of countries in respect with the implementation 
of food safety standards on vegetable and animal products. 
Given that we chose as the dependent variable the number of notifications for a 
given product (i) from an exporter (j) in year (t) as Nijt, the empirical analysis devel-
oped in this section is based on three types of reputation, i.e. we count the number of 
notifications per product, sector and country:
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•	 “Product	reputation”(N
ij(t-k)
) is defined by the correlation between the num-
ber of notifications for a given “product-exporter-year” combination Nijt and 
the number of notifications for that “product-exporter” in the previous years 
Nijt-k. If k=1, we consider the influence of notifications for that “product-
exporter” in the previous year Nijt-1. We will label this as the short-term 
reputation7. If k=2, we will refer to the influence of notifications for that 
“product-exporter” in the second previous year Nijt-2.We will label this as the 
medium-term reputation. If k=3, we consider the number of notifications for 
that “product-exporter” in the third previous year Nijt-3. This will be indicative 
of a long-term reputation.
•	 “Sector	reputation”(N
Ij(t-1)
) refers to the influence on the number of notifica-
tions, for a given “product-exporter-year” combination Nijt, exerted by the 
number of notifications for all products belonging to the same HS2 chapter 
for that exporter in one lagged year NIj(t-1). 
•	 “Exporter	reputation”(N
J(t-1)
) represents the influence on the number of noti-
fications, for a given “product-exporter-year” combination Nijt, exerted by the 
total number of notifications applied to the same exporter in the previous year. 
As an additional explanatory variable, the database includes the one-year lagged 
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDPpc) of each country of origin, based on 
World Bank data, at constant 2005 prices in US dollars. This variable is collected to 
take into account whether EU control of imported agri-food products is influenced 
by the level of development of the country of origin. The underlying assumption, as 
suggested by Taghouti et al. (2015), is that richer countries are less likely to fail a 
SPS control, due to more developed pre-export facilities and, in general, to a more 
export-oriented value chain.
We also consider the possibility of protectionist behaviour, with over-control after 
an export surge of a product, by including among the explanatory variables the previ-
ous year value of imports for that product –extracted from COMEXT-EUROSTAT 
data. The model specification is shown in Equation 1:
[1]
Where δk , φ, θ, ρ, σ, βj , γjk represent the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
to be estimated, and Zj is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for country (j) 
and zero otherwise. Zj represents the fixed effects of the 10 main agri-food exporters 
7 This is the product reputation studied previously in the available literature.
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among the 39 selected countries. This fixed effect is understood to consist of a distinc-
tive shift for those countries in comparison with the general effect of notifications8.
By examining the descriptive statistics of the set of variables, we note that the 
standard deviation of almost all variables is greater than the mean, which suggests 
that over-dispersion can be a problem for the econometric estimation. Another chal-
lenge posed by the data is the enormous amount of zero observations (no notifica-
tions for a given “product-origin-year”)9. These facts point to the need for effective 
count models to accurately estimate the relationship given in [1]. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimation. 
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max % of “zeroes” 
Nijt 0.12 1.694 0 140 97.0
Nijt-1 0.11 1.620 0 140 97.1
Nijt-2 0.10 1.513 0 140 97.4
Nijt-3 0.09 1.438 0 140 97.7
NIjt-1 1.16 7.454 0 210 83.2
NJt-1 21.72 43.721 0 294 18.1
Ln GDPpc(t-1) 8.32 1.476 4.850 11.120 0
Ln Import(t-1) 1 0.064 1 15 0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The available literature indicates that count variables follow a Poisson or one of 
its related distributions. However, the standard Poisson model is very sensitive to 
problems of over-dispersion and excess zeros in the dependent variable (Burger et 
al., 2009). Therefore, we estimate the previous equation with two different count 
models: the Negative Binomial model (NB) and the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
model (ZINB). These models are commonly used to deal with count variables in 
social sciences (Zeileis et al., 2008). The model depicted in [1], estimated with the 
ZINB, is called ZINB1, and when estimated with NB is called NB1. 
The NB belongs to the family of modified Poisson models. It is commonly used 
to correct the over-dispersion problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). The ZINB is 
widely used for modelling over-dispersed count data with excessive zeros (Lam-
bert, 1992; Greene, 1994). This model consists of a modified version of the NB. It 
8 Fixed product effects could not be estimated as convergence issues were insurmountable. The analysis of 
the most notified products (e.g., nut products) will constitute another area that merits further attention as a case 
study, so that the main factors that can affect product reputation can be identified.
9 In fact, there are 126,720 observations from the 15,098 notifications.
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is assumed that the zeroes present in the database can have two possible generation 
processes: one groups together only “strict” zeroes, i.e. if there is no trade flow for a 
“product-country”, it is not possible to record a notification. The second generation 
process corresponds to a situation of full compliance with SPS rules by actual trade 
flows. In this case no notification is reported, although a notification might, possibly, 
have been issued. Formally, the first process is modelled with a logit model to con-
sider the probability of zeroes with no possible notifications. The second process is a 
NB regression for the non-zero probability cases detected in the logit model.
In spite of the existence of the ZINB, the NB estimation does not have to be set 
apart beforehand. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) warn researchers that, in datasets with 
excess zeroes, the ZINB does not always fit the data better than the NB does. Statisti-
cal tests therefore have to be applied to select the best model. Furthermore, following 
Tudela-Marco et al. (2016), we added a restricted model in order to select which 
model could minimize the loss in fit with the data. This new model is a nested version 
of the saturated model [1] and assumes there is no other influence of previous’ years 
notifications for the top-ten notified exporters, or γjk = 0. It is given by Equation 2:
[2]
If the restriction is true, then the loss of fit between [1] and [2] is necessarily 
small. The model depicted in [2], estimated with the ZINB, is called ZINB2, and 
when estimated with NB is called NB2. The four estimations ZINB1, ZINB2, NB1 
and NB2 were run using the R-language.
5. Results
The logic behind using several autoregressive terms in the model is based on the 
assumption that reputation effect entails a lag time to be constructed. Thus, the cur-
rent notification will depend on its own previous values and other explicative vari-
ables. One tangible concern with such models is to test the stationarity condition. For 
this purpose, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test has been conducted. This test 
allows determining whether a unit root is present in an autoregressive model which 
can lead to biased statistical inference. 
Under the null hypothesis, H0, unit root exists that means data are non-stationary 
while the alternative H1 indicates that process has no unit root and data are stationary. 
The ADF test statistic is -157.48. (p-value=0.01). Hence, at the 5 % level of signifi-
cance, we reject the null hypothesis that data are non-stationary.
There are various statistical methods to determine the best model choice. In this 
paper, three methods were utilized: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the 
likelihood ratio test and the Vuong test. The Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) holds for non-
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nested models and is based on a comparison of the probabilities predicted by the two 
different estimation processes (ZINB and NB). Its null hypothesis is that the expected 
value of their log-likelihood ratios equals zero, which implies that both models are 
similar. The results of this test are given in Table 2, showing that the ZINB1 estima-
tion is preferable to the NB1 estimation
TABLE 2 
Comparison between NB1 and ZINB1 estimations. Vuong test
ZINB1 NB1
No. of observations 126,720 126,720
Overdispersion (α) 8.811*** 13.833
Vuong Test(a)
6.691*** 7.613***
21.063***
(a) The Z- statistic score is displayed for the Vuong test, which follows a standard normal distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The AIC and the likelihood ratio are suitable to make comparisons across the 
nested models, hence between ZINB1 and ZINB2, on the one hand, and NB1 and 
NB2 on the other hand. Table 3 shows that these indicators provide evidence of the 
superiority of the ZINB1 over its more restricted version ZINB2, as NB1 outper-
forms NB2.
TABLE 3
NB and ZINB models. Quality of fit indicators
ZINB1 ZINB2 NB1 NB2
AIC 38,884.107*** 39,306.805 41,360.402*** 41,968.189
Log Likelihood -19,389.053 -19,630.403 -20,631.201 -20,965.094
No. of observations 126,720 126,720 126,720 126,720
Overdispersion (α) 8.811*** 9.803 13.833 15.850
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Analyzing the results presented in Table 4, we find that almost all the reputation 
effects are statistically significant across models. The only exception is the country 
reputation, which is only significant according to the NB estimation. However, the 
effect of the product reputation is substantially greater than that of the sector and 
country reputations. Besides, the reputation decreases as time goes by: The one-year 
lagged product reputation is greater than the two-year lagged product reputation, 
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which in turn is greater than the three-year lagged product reputation. However, it 
is noticeable that the three-year lagged reputation is at least one order of magnitude 
greater than the sector and country reputations, which confirms its relevance in shap-
ing current notifications.
TABLE 4
Statistical models: Estimated parameters
ZINB1 ZINB2 NB1 NB2
 (Intercept) -0.2923 (10.433) 0.2827 (41.961) 0.0479 (1555182.188) 0.2790 (1363608.163)
Nijt-1 0.7157 (0.041)
*** 0.4906 (0.022)*** 1.0963 (0.021)*** 0.7220 (0.011)***
Nijt-2 0.5555 (0.048)
*** 0.2339 (0.023)*** 0.9556 (0.026)*** 0.4398 (0.014)***
Nijt-3 0.2818 (0.047)
*** 0.1650 (0.0230)*** 0.6088 (0.025)*** 0.3491 (0.012)***
NIjt.1 0.0178 (0.002)
*** 0.0180 (0.0024)*** 0.0278 (0.001)*** 0.0301 (0.001)***
NJt-1 0.0008 (0.0004) 0.0007 (0.0004) 0.0032 (0.0004)
*** 0.0031 (0.0005)***
Ln GDPt-1 -0.262 (0.018)
*** -0.2804 (0.017)*** -0.1220 (0.017)*** -0.1330 (0.0170)***
Ln Importt-1 -0.6060 (10.432) -0.8741 (41.961) -3.1288 (1555182.18) -3.1138 (1363608.16311)
China 1.4076 (0.109)*** 0.9038 (0.101)*** 1.6920 (0.103)*** 1.0797 (0.111)***
Morocco 0.1939 (0.134) 0.3446 (0.111)** 0.4074 (0.124)** 0.4899 (0.115)***
United States 1.4974 (0.103)*** 1.2567 (0.100)*** 1.7347 (0.106)*** 1.3659 (0.111)***
Turkey 1.5814 (0.112)*** 0.9969 (0.107)*** 1.5764 (0.108)*** 0.9355 (0.119)***
Thailand 1.1618 (0.105)*** 0.9713 (0.0918)*** 1.3936 (0.095)*** 1.1495 (0.097)***
Brazil 0.8743 (0.102)*** 0.5966 (0.0979)*** 1.2153 (0.100)*** 0.8520 (0.105)***
Argentina 0.6160 (0.117)*** 0.4130 (0.106)*** 0.7923 (0.110)*** 0.5520 (0.114)***
Ukraine -1.175 (0.225)*** -0.9545 (0.181)*** -0.9124 (0.214)*** -0.7330 (0.186)***
Vietnam 0.7093 (0.119)*** 0.4384 (0.111)*** 0.9326 (0.105)*** 0.7142 (0.107)***
Egypt 0.0274 (0.132) -0.0736 (0.120) 0.3436 (0.124)** 0.1826 (0.125)
Nijt-1
China -0.483 (0.058)*** -0.8020 (0.033)***
Morocco 0.1182 (0.160) 0.0822 (0.119)
USA -0.2496 (0.08)** -0.5745 (0.038)***
Turkey -0.492 (0.056)*** -0.7753 (0.031)***
Brazil -0.283 (0.079)*** -0.5882 (0.048)***
Argentina -0.2093 (0.114) -0.4027 (0.049)***
Thailand -0.330 (0.083)*** -0.5352 (0.054)***
Vietnam -0.558 (0.084)*** -0.8004 (0.054)***
Ukraine 1.8046 (0.623)** 2.0309 (0.374)***
Egypt -0.1443 (0.128) -0.3397 (0.097)***
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ZINB1 ZINB2 NB1 NB2
Nijt-2
China -0.460 (0.065)*** -0.8233 (0.038)***
Morocco -0.3067 (0.186) -0.4108 (0.1568)**
USA -0.651 (0.073)*** -1.0393 (0.049)***
Turkey -0.569 (0.059)*** -0.9767 (0.043)***
Brazil -0.477 (0.093)*** -0.8165 (0.067)***
Argentina -0.2933 (0.115)* -0.6022 (0.067)***
Thailand -0.2750 (0.090)** -0.5799 (0.061)***
Vietnam -0.447 (0.077)*** -0.8256 (0.057)***
Ukraine -1.1198 (0.568)* -1.6489 (0.693)*
Egypt -0.2624 (0.158) -0.4793 (0.110)***
Nijt-3
China -0.1897 (0.063)** -0.4913 (0.037)***
Morocco 0.3659 (0.1762)* 0.2208 (0.170)
USA -0.1733 (0.069)* -0.4858 (0.042)***
Turkey -0.2763(0.05)*** -0.5844 (0.038)***
Brazil -0.2083 (0.080)** -0.5151 (0.055)***
Argentina -0.3392 (0.1361)* -0.4474 (0.054)***
Thailand -0.1052 (0.100) -0.2467 (0.058)***
Vietnam 0.0826 (0.124) 0.1880 (0.059)**
Ukraine 1.6671 (1.040) 1.7599 (1.077)
Egypt -0.0428 (0.140) -0.2369 (0.107)*
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Source: Authors’ calculations.
It should be noted that the country of origin per capita GDP is also significant 
since, as expected, the less is the per capita GDP, the higher is the probability of no-
tifications. Another point to remark is that the value of previous years’ imports is not 
significant in determining current year notifications. The effect of past import surges 
is therefore not relevant in this case.
As regards country fixed effects, in the most cases there is a higher propensity to 
receive notifications in the 10 most notified countries compared with the 29-country 
reference group. Only for Egypt the variable is not statistically significant, indicating 
a similar behaviour as for the reference group. Furthermore, we may note that Mo-
rocco’s dummy variable is not significant in the ZINB1 model; and Ukraine shows 
TABLE 4 (cont.)
Statistical models: Estimated parameters
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less propensity, according to the negative significant coefficient in the four models. 
As far as the remaining countries are concerned, Turkey in the ZINB1 and the US in 
the other three models have the highest coefficients.
Turning to the interactions between the country fixed effects and the product repu-
tations, in most cases the coefficients are significant. Their magnitude is usually less in 
the more efficient ZINB1 than in the NB1. We have used these interactions to provide 
a comprehensive view of the influence of past notifications on current notifications 
for the top-ten countries. Based on the ZINB1 results, we calculated the total effect of 
the three product notifications on the current number of notifications. To this end, we 
added the coefficients of the interactions with each country to the respective coeffi-
cients of the product reputation effects. These calculations are depicted in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5 
Comparison of the reputation effects between the top-ten notified countries 
and the reference group
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
We identified two groups of countries, depending on the evolution of the reputa-
tion effects and the long-term reputation. The first group is composed of China, the 
US, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina. Clearly, the reputation effects are diminishing 
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over time and the effect of long-term reputation is less than for the reference group. 
This may indicate an effective effort by these countries to fix SPS problems detected 
in their exports to the EU.
Contrariwise, a second group of exporters, comprising Morocco, Thailand, Viet-
nam, Ukraine and Egypt, presents long-term reputation effects that are greater or equal 
to those for the reference group. Furthermore, the reputation effects do not show a de-
creasing path from the short to the long term, with the exception of Egypt. These coun-
tries are therefore performing worse than the previous group both in terms of long-run 
reputation and in terms of an effective reduction over time. This may indicate that the 
management of SPS measures in their exports to the EU is a challenge for them. 
6. Conclusions
Our study aimed to investigate how past notifications can affect the application 
of SPS measures to EU imports of agri-food products. This aim is in line with an 
emerging trend in literature on the implementation of SPS measures. The underlying 
rationale is that past notifications can be relevant in determining which product, sec-
tor or country of origin is subject to checks: Border inspectors can be expected to tar-
get products that have had problems in the past or countries with a high probability of 
having problems to export certain products identified as sensitive in previous inspec-
tions. Our approach is based on the fact that EU import notifications are explained 
by three types of reputation effects, namely product, sector and country reputation. 
Besides, we checked for the effect of the previous year import value and per capita 
GDP of exporting countries. Furthermore, this paper raises the question of the effect 
of the evolution of reputation over time. To this end, we checked whether current 
notifications are affected by the previous year’s notifications as well as by the second 
and third preceding years’ notifications. 
We used the RASFF database of EU notifications, in line with a number of recent 
research studies on trade issues. Three major problems were found in building the da-
tabase: (1) the conversion of all recorded notifications from verbal form to HS code 
(2) the over-dispersion in the data and (3) the excess of zeros in observations. Me-
thodologically, and in order to take into account these features of the dataset, a word 
recognition algorithm was developed, and two count models were used to estimate 
these relationships.
Our findings support previous evidence found by Jouanjean et al. (2015) for the 
US, as well as by Tudela-Marco et al. (2016) and Taghouti et al. (2015), suggesting 
that EU SPS border controls are affected by reputation. As regards the evolution of 
reputation over time, our empirical results suggest that the number of EU notifica-
tions in the current year is affected firstly by the product’s own reputation, with a 
relatively stronger effect in the case of one-lagged-year notifications in comparison 
with two or three lagged years.
After the product reputations, the sector reputation plays a smaller explanatory role, 
indicating a certain cross-attribution of reputation among similar products. Conversely, 
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however, country reputation does not affect the number of current notifications or only 
does so very slightly. Altogether, this indicates that cross-attribution does not impact all 
the exports from the same country but tends to be limited to similar products.
Similarly, notifications are not affected by previous import values, thus counter-
ing the hypothesis of possible protectionist behaviour after an import surge. How-
ever, the number of notifications varies negatively with the per capita GDP of the 
exporter, suggesting that a country’s development level is a key determinant of the 
integration of agro-exporting enterprises in the global value chains in terms of com-
plying with EU product safety standards.
In most of the exporter countries under consideration, two different patterns were 
detected. For some countries, product reputation effects diminish consistently over 
time, which points to effective efforts on the part of these countries to fix the SPS 
problems notified previously. As a result, the long-term effect of a notification is 
very small or even absent. On the contrary, for another group of countries, a three-
years-ago notification has detrimental effects on current SPS compliance. This is 
probably indicative that the efforts undertaken to fulfil SPS rules have not been suffi-
cient and exports are still burdened by past (bad) performance. More rigorous public 
policies with pre-export facilities and controls could reverse this trend. 
Some implications can be extracted from the results of this study as well as from 
similar findings in previous literature. First, the product reputation effect has been 
demonstrated to be a solid element framing SPS compliance in the agri-food imports 
of the two main agri-food world importers. Checking whether product reputation 
matters at other major importers’ borders can be a relevant research area. Investiga-
ting the evolution of reputation effects for different countries in other geographical 
areas can also help to contrast current results.
Secondly, this paper has shown that long-term reputation also matters and, more 
specifically, that some countries have been able to soften its impact while others 
have not. Therefore, analyzing the measures implemented in different instances can 
be a fruitful exercise, not only in terms of pure academic research but also as a basis 
for good policymaking. In this vein, Soriano and Garrido (2015) highlight the trade-
enhancing effects of public-private investments in infrastructure in developing coun-
tries. Some pre-export facilities such as warehouses, terminals, roads etc. are part of 
this infrastructure and can enhance compliance with SPS rules.
Thirdly, it should be noted that, in dealing with the different types of notifica-
tions, our study has not used a causality framework. The shift in the RASFF data 
from information to border rejections may suggest a tightening of the SPS rules at the 
EU borders that deserves further attention. Finally, our study provides an opportunity 
to stress that the RASSF database can be a rich source of detailed information on 
agri-food trade. Focusing on the reasons for notifications or further investigating the 
most notified products can provide other valuable insights into the implementation of 
SPS measures at the EU borders.
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